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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

MAJ. GENERAL PETER DEVLIN (UK)

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL COALITION

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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31 DECEMBER 2007

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BAGHDAD, IRAQ

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provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6)

This is

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the Multinational Corps Iraq Historian.

Today is Monday, the 31st of December 2007, at the al Faw Palace, Headquarters, Multinational Corps Iraq, outside of Baghdad, Iraq, and it is approximately 1005.

I am here interviewing Major General Devlin, who is the Deputy Commanding General for Coalition and Infrastructure.

General Devlin, could you go ahead and introduce yourself in your own voice?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sure. My name is Major General Peter Devlin, Deputy Commanding General for Coalition and Infrastructure, the last day of 2007.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Then we have -- For the

listener's benefit, this is the second interview with General Devlin. He was previously interviewed on the 18th of June 2007, but also to bring the listener up to speed, General Devlin is a Canadian officer who is on exchange to 3 Corps, as is mentioned in the first

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1 interview, but the finer details on that would all be  
2 found in the first interview.

3 Sir, we also did a formal release document  
4 during the first interview. If it is acceptable to  
5 you, we will consider that to still be in effect.

6 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Please do.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) All right, sir.

8 Sir, my first question is kind of a  
9 general one, which is: Since we sat down in June,  
10 have there been any dramatic changes in your tasks or  
11 the Commander's guidance from General Odierno to you?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No, there has not  
13 been any change. I still focus on the Coalition. I  
14 focus on Iraqi infrastructure, with a priority to  
15 electricity and oil.

16 I guess, (b)(3), (b)(6) the one thing that has  
17 changed, the other area that I was focusing on was  
18 international organizations, mainly the U.N. So while  
19 I don't think there has been a change in tasking, I  
20 would say that there has been a change from a U.N.  
21 point of view as to what they see happening in Iraq  
22 and what potential they see themselves playing inside

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1 Iraq.

2 I think that has been triggered by two  
3 main events. Event isn't the right word -- two main  
4 areas. Firstly, the lessened violence and, therefore,  
5 greater stability and, I would argue, much greater  
6 opportunities, much greater potential for the U.N. to  
7 become involved; as well as a change in leadership,  
8 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

9 There is a new SRSG, (b)(6)  
10 (Phonetic). So he is a special representative of the  
11 Secretary General. He comes in with two new deputies,  
12 (b)(6) (Phonetic) who looks after the  
13 agencies, the nongovernmental coordination,  
14 humanitarian assistance and that realm, and (b)(6)  
15 (b)(6) who looks after more of the political side of  
16 the house, a new Chief of Staff and a team that  
17 surrounds those people.

18 They bring a whole new level of energy to  
19 the U.N. portion of the effort here in Iraq. I mean  
20 that in a very, very positive way. So that, coupled  
21 with greater opportunity that comes from more  
22 stability in Iraq, has signaled more excitement within

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1 the U.N. community and the agencies for their  
2 potential involvement here in Iraq.

3 What that means on the ground is that  
4 UNAMI (Phonetic) in Baghdad will see more staff.  
5 Their regional office in Urbil (Phonetic) will grow  
6 almost 50 percent. The office in Basra, which was  
7 open, then closed because of the unacceptable threat  
8 to the U.N. -- that office will reopen, and they are  
9 planning a visit to Anbar and one to Tallil in early  
10 2008.

11 This is all great stuff, because it  
12 signals the fact that the international community  
13 beyond the Coalition sees what is happening here as  
14 positive and that it is time for them to make a  
15 contribution to helping Iraqis grow.

16 More on the U.N. is their involvement in  
17 major efforts, some of their agencies. An example  
18 would be the United Nations Development Program has  
19 been involved in Biaf as well as the port at Um Qasr,  
20 two gateways, two very important gateways to Iraq for  
21 the international community for economic growth, for  
22 development, and more.

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1                   So to have connected the U.N., the U.N.  
2 agencies, in this particular case UNDP, with MNFI and  
3 our efforts in Baghdad with the airport in Basra and  
4 Un Qasr, the port, I think, is also just a small  
5 signal of greater cooperation, greater understanding  
6 and, again, more potential for Iraqi people.

7                   (b)(3), (b)(6)   Sir, can you talk to me  
8 a little bit about what has been the nature of your  
9 engagement, in particular with these U.N.  
10 developments? Are you having regular meetings with  
11 them or periodic meetings, and how are those  
12 structured? How have you become involved with these  
13 changed?

14                  MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I saw it as an  
15 opportunity that we were not availing ourselves of,  
16 both MNCI and MNFI, and having had a couple of tours  
17 wearing a blue beret and touching some of these  
18 agencies, it just struck me that we needed to engage  
19 in a more deliberate and more powerful way,  
20 particularly as violence levels trended downward.

21                  So I have -- Since we last spoke, I have  
22 now been attending the bi-weekly U.N.'s strategic

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1 meeting, a bi-weekly U.N. strategic planning group,  
2 and I have been to Amman to brief the agencies and  
3 UNAMI, as you know, is split between Baghdad and Amman  
4 with most of their effort in Amman, because there was  
5 too much risk here. It is a very risk averse  
6 organization.

7 So what I see my role is connecting  
8 people. So I have connected the agencies in a more  
9 deliberate way with the MNFI staff and the MNCI staff,  
10 specifically the C-9 staff and the Civil Affairs  
11 Brigade.

12 An example of that would be having gone to  
13 visit the NIAC, the National Iraqi Assistance Center,  
14 yesterday, and the fallout from that is, again, more  
15 intros of Civil Affairs Brigade, who has the  
16 responsibility for running the NIAC, with U.N.  
17 agencies that are doing or attempting to do very  
18 similar things.

19 So my message always is we just need to  
20 coordinate our efforts so that we realize the greatest  
21 gains for the Iraqi people.

22 Let me also touch on security for a

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1 moment, if I could. I expected that in early of 2008  
2 we will receive a visit from (b)(6)  
3 (Phonetic). (b)(6) is a security and safety  
4 honcho for the U.N.

5 We expect that, when he visits and when he  
6 understands the truth of what is happening here in  
7 Iraq, that there will be a greater willingness from  
8 the U.N. Headquarters in New York to lessen some of  
9 the restrictions that are placed on the U.N. in terms  
10 of their movement, in terms of how many people they  
11 are permitted in theater, in terms of the things you  
12 need to have in place to be able to house U.N. people,  
13 whether that be overhead protection or accommodations  
14 or dining facilities, how you move, what size force  
15 you have to have with you, which is an MNFI force.

16 So that is a good thing. So when (b)(6)  
17 (b)(6) comes and he understands what is happening  
18 better on the ground here throughout Iraq and his  
19 destinations -- There was a visit planned for December  
20 that incredibly was cancelled, but Baghdad, Urbil and  
21 Basra -- when he understands that area better, we are  
22 hopeful that there will be a lessening of the

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1 restrictions that will allow more freedom for our U.N.  
2 friends to move about, to assess, to coordinate and  
3 more potential for the Iraqi people.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Has there been any actual  
5 discussion on where they would headquarter a larger  
6 contingent? I say that, kind of looking back to their  
7 departure from theater fairly early on after their  
8 headquarters was bombed.

9 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, they have  
10 headquarters in the International Zone, and they have  
11 beefed that up so that there are more bed spaces there  
12 to be able to accommodate a larger group, as they have  
13 in Urbil, and in Basra they have made an arrangement  
14 with the Brits that are there to be able to house - I  
15 think it is around a dozen people, at the airbase  
16 there inside the Britain compound.

17 The visit to Ramadi has been coordinated  
18 with the Marines, and so they will go visit the  
19 Marines and look at the potential to be on-FOB corner  
20 with a view -- if they could realize their real dream,  
21 with a separate access, whether it exists or whether  
22 they have to build it. There is a need for a certain

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1 level of independence with the U.N. So things like a  
2 separate entrance is important for them, and MNF-West  
3 understands this very well.

4 So there is stuff that already exists, and  
5 there is stuff that we are looking at -- that the U.N.  
6 is looking at building, and there's caution. You know  
7 all the stuff that goes on with all that involved.

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) In general, just as a  
9 reference point, do you have a sense for what their  
10 presence is, how many people? Again, you indicated  
11 they were just in the IZ at a headquarters there.

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Sixty-ish, going up  
13 to 100 in Baghdad; 30 going up to 50 in Urbil; zero  
14 going up to about a dozen in Basra; and the rest of  
15 the stuff is still to be determined, Anbar and Tallil,

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. That is an  
17 interesting mission, sir. I wasn't aware of that. So  
18 that is actually a pretty neat thing to be involved  
19 with.

20 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It is. The real  
21 question, (b)(3), (b)(6) is who coordinates the efforts of the  
22 greater international community in Iraq.

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1 [REDACTED] Do you have an MNFI  
2 counterpart who is working this issue?

3 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Correct. Yes.

4 [REDACTED] Embassy?

5 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's Major General  
6 Skip Scott in Strat Effects who is my counterpart. I  
7 have a little bit more freedom than Skip Scott does,  
8 which is why I have been -- at least I would like to  
9 think that I have been the guy who has been  
10 instigating some of this, because Skip is the guy  
11 involved in the Government of Iraq Ministry Liaison in  
12 a huge way. So he is the guy that does a tremendous  
13 amount of stuff with the government of Iraq and  
14 ministries.

15 I don't do that stuff, and so I channel my  
16 energy toward the U.N. and coordinating with them, and  
17 other organizations that have been connected have been  
18 OPA (Phonetic) with the U.N. So the Office of  
19 Provincial Affairs and the PRTs and EPRTs with the  
20 U.N., particularly those that are in PIC provinces.

21 [REDACTED] Those that have gone to  
22 British or Iraqi control?

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1 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. And Tallil  
2 is a great example where there are three Provincial  
3 Reconstruction Teams that are housed in one camp,  
4 which is why, I think, that there is great potential  
5 for the U.N. to be linked in there, and from a single  
6 point have access to three provinces.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Anything else  
8 along that U.N. engagement piece, sir?

9 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No. I think that is  
10 pretty much it. You know, I will tell you that one of  
11 the great strengths of multinationality, if I can kind  
12 of steer off, along with the U.N. is the Canadian  
13 Embassy, also part of a group, the Iraq contact group,  
14 are a bunch of countries that are accredited to Iraq  
15 but don't have an embassy in Iraq.

16 Canada is a great example. So our embassy  
17 in Amman, Jordan, and the Ambassador there -- she is  
18 also the Ambassador to Iraq and has presented her  
19 credentials to the President, and so is the accredited  
20 -- and I'm not sure whether that is the right term or  
21 not, but anyway she is Canada's Ambassador to Iraq.

22 There are other countries that are based

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1 in Amman that have ambassadors to Iraq, but they are  
2 housed in -- because they have the responsibility for  
3 more than one country, they are housed in Jordan.

4 The heart of that potential is also a  
5 great thing, and because of the flag that I wear, she  
6 has been very helpful to the efforts in Iraq in simple  
7 things like hosting dinners where Iraq is the theme of  
8 the dinner or the Iraq Contact Group meetings where  
9 I've become involved in providing the info for that  
10 presentation or that theme for that particular period  
11 of time, a monthly type thing.

12 So it's just another way that the  
13 international community and multinationality here in  
14 Iraq makes a contribution, perhaps small, but it  
15 touches different countries. It touches their  
16 interest in Iraq and in the Iraqi people. It perhaps  
17 leads to more resources or a greater commitment to the  
18 country, and so it's things like that that are  
19 important. That's just a country.

20 I could go on with the EU as well, which  
21 has a representative in Baghdad and provides 60  
22 percent of the U.N. funding, comes from the EU. So

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1 another area where we, the international community, or  
2 we, MNFI, where we, CENTCOM, where we -- if I can be  
3 so bold to say we, the U.S. can lead on for greater  
4 involvement in Iraq.

5 I could also tell you, from an EU point of  
6 view, that over 60 percent of the EU vote -- as you  
7 know, the EU is a voting organization. Over 60  
8 percent of their votes by country have served in Iraq,  
9 and the current vote is about 33 percent.

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) So 60 percent of the  
11 constituent countries have served in Iraq?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Thirty-plus are  
13 current serving in Iraq, of the vote.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay.

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Of the vote.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Wanted to make sure I was  
17 following you correctly.

18 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: So if I use an  
19 example like Poland, Poland based on their population,  
20 the strength of their economy and blah-blah-blah, have  
21 X percent of the EU vote. So if I add up that and the  
22 nations that have participated in OIF, over 60 percent

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1 of that vote has served in Iraq, and currently we are  
2 just over 30 percent of the EU vote is participating  
3 here.

4 I could pick other examples like the Brits  
5 and others, but just as a point of reference.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Certainly. Sir, on this  
7 line, just kind of segueing to the current status of  
8 the broader Coalition Force responsibilities for you,  
9 can you give me a little bit of a snapshot, where we  
10 are now in terms of what the Coalition element's  
11 strength and number of nations are?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: There are 26  
13 nations, about 11-11,500 non-Americans. That goes up  
14 and down as forces RIP in and out, but that's where we  
15 are at today, and I think things will change a bit in  
16 2008. I think that you will see that the numbers will  
17 go down in 2008, but I tell my media buddies that it  
18 is wrong to measure the strength of the Coalition by  
19 the number of flags and how many soldiers are on the  
20 ground, because nations make a difference in Iraq  
21 through a whole host of ways.

22

1.4b

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1.4b

That kind of stuff is -- you don't see it in counting flags and counting soldiers, but has a tremendous impact on what is happening inside Iraq. So don't just count flags. Please just don't count soldiers. Look at how much enthusiasm there is, how much energy there is for what is happening in Iraq and for the Iraqi people.

(b)(3), (b)(6) So you talked about looking ahead to 2008 and, certainly, we know some things now we didn't know a few months ago in terms of what has been announced for production of the

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1

1.4b

2

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN:

1.4b

3

1.4b

4

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Right.

5

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: And others, I'm

6

sure, will follow.

7

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Have you been involved in

8

the planning process with regard to, from a tactical

9

standpoint, how we fill those gaps or what the

10

reconfiguration of the areas of responsibility will

11

be?

12

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes. There are

13

going to be some adjustments on the ground. There are

14

going to be some boundary changes. There are going to

15

be some things that -- Take MND-Center South as a

16

great example.

17

1.4b

leave after having made a

18

huge contribution here -- huge -- their battle space

19

will be subsumed into MND-Center. We are hopeful that

20

some of the units that participate in MND-Center will

21

continue to participate in OIF, whether it be out of

22

Camp Echo or whether out of a different camp.

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1 Up north in MND-Northeast, we are pleased

2 1.4b

3 in 2008, albeit at a smaller number. So still a two-  
4 star HQ with 550-ish soldiers, but what they do up  
5 there is a very special thing in terms of their civic  
6 work, in terms of vo-tech programs, in terms of their  
7 hospital and more.

8 Likewise, in the south with MND-Southeast,

9 1.4b

10 So this is, I think, expected that, as we  
11 achieve a greater level of stability in Iraq, as we  
12 strengthen the ISF and the ISF becomes more capable,  
13 more capable based on their numbers, their training,  
14 their equipment and their experience, that they have  
15 the capability to care for their battle space.

16 1.4b

17 1.4b

18 a good thing for Iraq that they are still  
19 participating here and still training their Iraqi

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1 brothers.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, we have had some new  
3 partners join us since we talked last to you. Some of

4  
5 1.4b  
6

7 component -- any big challenges with getting them in  
8 place, getting them into the fight, so to speak? Any  
9 thoughts on how that all came together?

10 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: I think that the

11 1.4b

12 soldiers here doing -- more than 2000. As you know,  
13 they are up in Wasit Province, part of MND-Center out  
14 at Camp Delta.

15 They also are responsible for the middle  
16 ring security in the International Zone for the U.N.  
17 with a force of about 250-ish soldiers that are there.

18 1.4b

19 here doing tremendous work.

20 They have undergone some great training,  
21 some training at home, some training in Europe and  
22 some great training down in --

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1 [REDACTED] Talking about the  
2 training that they had.

3 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Yes. I had the  
4 opportunity to visit their training down in Kuwait  
5 sponsored by Task Force [REDACTED] 1.4a. So some wonderful

6 [REDACTED] 1.4a, 1.4b  
7 they fell in on [REDACTED] b 6 at Camp Delta. So 300-plus  
8 (Inaudible) and Humvees with communications gear, with  
9 the Coalition version of Blue Force Tracker and a  
10 counter-IED suite, in a tough area, predominantly  
11 manning checkpoints, six checkpoints, all that have  
12 been carefully identified based on an IPB analysis of  
13 the flow of accelerants toward Baghdad and toward the  
14 rest of Iraq.

15 They are very strong soldiers, very  
16 motivated soldiers. I have had the opportunity to  
17 visit them at Camp Delta a couple of times, as well as  
18 at their checkpoints -- hard, fit soldiers. So these  
19 are guys and gals that are living out at checkpoints  
20 and at a combat outpost next to that checkpoint,  
21 living in a tent, living on a cot, eating a few MREs  
22 a day and one TRAD a day.

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1           If they are lucky, they might have  
2 Internet access that is shared amongst 146 people --  
3 is the one that I most recently visited. You know,  
4 they shower in lukewarm water, if they are lucky.  
5 They shit in a hole. So they are living in austere  
6 conditions, and they are doing marvelous work.

7           The limiting factor -- The limiting  
8 factor, to my -- I guess I shouldn't have been  
9 surprised at this, but this is the limiting thing with

10 [REDACTED] 1.4b

11 [REDACTED] 1.4b

12 prized asset and tough to find, very, very tough to  
13 find. That is a real challenge, and that is what  
14 limits our ability to fully exploit the talents of the

15 [REDACTED] 1.4b

16 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

17 One of the questions that  
18 has come up, I know just in the assessments, is the

19 [REDACTED] 1.4b

20 capacity and go outside of their originally assigned  
21 area. Do you have any thoughts on where that  
22 discussion is right now and if that is another  
opportunity to utilize them?

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1 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, I think it's  
2 a great opportunity. [REDACTED] 1.4b  
3 right now. Their (Inaudible) was briefed and has

4 [REDACTED] 1.4b

5 We are hopeful that they will say yes,  
6 because I don't -- You know, again as stability  
7 continues to improve, we can harness their potential  
8 much better in other areas, and it is not that far  
9 away, up the street in [REDACTED] 1.4a area, which is part of  
10 MND-Center, where they could really use and exploit

11 [REDACTED] 1.4b

12 caveat-free nature of their deployment here to good  
13 effect, good effect for the people of Iraq.

14 Let me be very specific here, because what  
15 their presence will do is will allow clearing of areas  
16 and of presence -- of presence in areas where [REDACTED] 1.4a and  
17 MND-Center does not have a presence right now. There  
18 are not ISF soldiers in number to go into some of  
19 these areas, which are tough areas.

20 These are areas where we also have Iraqi  
21 infrastructure challenges, where there are downed 400

22 [REDACTED] 1.4b

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1.4b

So where there are 20-plus hours of power per day in the south to where there are 12 to 14 hours of power per day in Baghdad, we can bring more of that north, especially with deals that are being cut with the Iranians to import 200 megawatts of power per day. We need the lines to bring them north, and we don't have the lines to bring them north right now.

So that is an example, a very real

1.4b

current battle space.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

You talked about the

Concerned Local Citizens for a moment there, sir, and I wanted to ask a broader question.

When we look back over the last eight to 12 months now, one of the things that emerged as a key in that was the reconciliation initiative and then the

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1 Concerned Local Citizens movement.

2 Do you have any unique perspectives as you  
3 have gone out and worked with our Coalition partners,  
4 how that has manifested itself in the areas where we  
5 have had primarily Coalition forces?

6 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: You know, I think it  
7 has been a very powerful thing, but if I can, can I  
8 just draw you a little sketch here, because this is  
9 time, and this is violence, and this is June, and this  
10 is the surge, and surge defined as (b)(6)  
11 (Phonetic), June defined as Phantom Hammer, followed  
12 a couple of months later by Phantom Strike.

13 Here is what I would tell you, (b)(3), (b)(6) and  
14 it struck me just recently in my travels around. So  
15 I asked a young American battalion commander what was  
16 the thing that allowed violence to start to trend  
17 downward, and I said, so was it these Concerned Local  
18 Citizens. And he goes, well, hold it for a moment;  
19 you have to understand that the Concerned Local  
20 Citizen movement started because we crushed the  
21 insurgency.

22 So a battalion that arrived in Baghdad in

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1 the middle of March, 800 guys working a neighborhood  
2 of 300,000 Iraqis, a lot of violence, a lot of IEDs,  
3 a lot of direct fire attacks, a lot of indirect fire  
4 and more. March arrival, heavy fighting in April, May  
5 and June, and then the insurgents said, okay, you win,  
6 we've had enough, can we talk.

7 The costs, 18 American lives from the  
8 battalion of 800, and 80 wounded. So that, I would  
9 submit to you, (b)(3), (b)(6) was a vitally important trigger  
10 in instigating the movement of the CLCs forward.

11 So I would hate for people to think that  
12 it was the awakening of the CLCs that it happened. It  
13 happened, because the insurgency was being crushed by  
14 the surge, by the combat operations that were being  
15 conducted across the country, but certainly with a  
16 priority to Baghdad and the belts.

17 Since that time, the Concerned Local  
18 Citizen movement is a very important initiative. It is  
19 an initiative, though, that needs to be managed very  
20 carefully, because of the expectations.

21 So while we have targets moving 20 percent  
22 into the ISF, police and army, the 80 percent others

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1 we need to find -- the government of Iraq needs to  
2 find permanent employment for these guys. And whether  
3 that is -- Whether that is in the service industry,  
4 the public service industry to support communities or  
5 whether that be in the manufacturing sector or the  
6 service industries, it just needs to be coordinated  
7 well so that the window that has been opened by the  
8 CLCs doesn't come crashing closed and, as it comes  
9 crashing closed, it crashes the expectations and the  
10 belief in the future of the Iraqis.

11 I think all that stuff is happening. I  
12 hope the government of Iraq steps forward in a more  
13 powerful way than they have demonstrated for the past  
14 couple of months, and that would be -- if you were to  
15 say what is your biggest fear, my biggest fear is that  
16 the government of Iraq is not stepping forward  
17 strongly enough, vigorously enough, enthusiastically  
18 enough to realize an absolutely extraordinary  
19 opportunity that they have, that they have not had  
20 over several years, and it is there.

21 It is right at their doorstep, and they  
22 need -- all they need to do is pick it up. There is

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1 some risk in picking it up but, man, you got to pick  
2 it up and do something with it or the window will come  
3 crashing closed.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Given the very nuanced  
5 aspect of that, again looking at our Coalition

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7  
8 1.4b  
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11 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right.

12 (b)(3), (b)(6)

-- how much of a degree  
13 of difficulty does that add to developing CLCs, say,

14 1.4b

15 1.4b

are? In other words, has the CLC movement  
16 been as critical in those areas, number one? And has  
17 it -- Do our Coalition partners get that, so to speak?

18 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, there are no  
19 CLCs in the southern part of the country, but by MNFI  
20 and Government of Iraq guidance. There are CLCs in  
21 MND-Center South, and they are CLCs that provide  
22 security along MSRs and ASRs, as an example, and there

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1 has been talk about a CLC type organization to help  
2 support the growth of the agriculture industry in that  
3 province.

4 As you know, Katasiyah (Phonetic) is very  
5 much an agriculture based province that would benefit  
6 from more attention there. By that, I mean water to  
7 the fields, fertilizer, feeds, and perhaps some of the  
8 new technology that is out there, but is appropriate  
9 to their farming and their culture and all that stuff.  
10 But in the rest of the country, southern provinces,  
11 there are not CLCs.

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, changing the subject  
13 just a little bit, I just want to make sure we don't  
14 miss this. In your responsibility in the areas of  
15 infrastructure, as you look back again since we spoke  
16 in mid-June, of course, there continues to be a lot of  
17 interest emphasis at the highest command levels on how  
18 much energy is being generated and how much oil is  
19 being exported.

20 Of course, I know you interface with a lot  
21 of different pieces of that, whether it is the C3,  
22 infrastructure protection element or C9. Where are

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1 you seeing your energies in that area? What has been  
2 your primary focus since we spoke last?

3 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: It's been mainly  
4 tied to the (Inaudible) and events that I have  
5 participated in, as well as opportunities that are  
6 highlighted from those meetings and things that need  
7 a bit of attention.

8 I would tell you that it's the darnedest  
9 thing, actually, (b)(3), (b)(6) the mystery of oil. The  
10 Minister of Oil is an idiot. But the Ministry of Oil  
11 has achieved some amazing things, despite the guy at  
12 the top.

13 So there are exports, probably around \$35  
14 billion worth of exports, about 4 billion -- 3.5  
15 billion higher than what they are budgeting was. The  
16 exports north had a 46 inch line. How they are able  
17 to fix brakes, the things that have happened -- I  
18 would just say, I say the things that have happened  
19 because -- and this is mainly in the north. The  
20 things -- The arrangements is probably a better word  
21 than things, but it's as loose as that.

22 The arrangements that appear to have been

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1 made so that there are less booms along strategic  
2 pipelines, is all phenomenal stuff, which has allowed  
3 the flow of crude and product to reach levels that it  
4 hasn't seen in years, and it is being managed  
5 reasonably well.

6 The disappointment is the relationship  
7 between oil and electricity, whereas the Minister of  
8 Electricity is much more engaged, certainly much more  
9 engaged with MNFI, tries to exploit the skill and  
10 talent and the resources within the greater MNFI to  
11 realize more electricity for the people of Iraq.

12 Some of that is tied to the quantity and  
13 the type of fuel he can access, whether it be from the  
14 Minister of Oil or whether it be from neighboring  
15 countries. But whenever there is fuel involved, the  
16 Minister of Oil is involved, and it has been  
17 frustratingly slow.

18 Things like contracts, like diesel  
19 contracts from Kuwait, which took months -- months --  
20 to coordinate -- unbelievable. Months, many long  
21 months where there could have been more hours of power  
22 per day to Joe Iraqi, because from where I sit, there

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1 didn't seem to be a strong enough desire from the  
2 Minister of Oil to sort out the bureaucratic crap that  
3 made the months -- the days turn to weeks turn to  
4 months.

5 So some amazing things happened in oil.  
6 I think that they will continue to happen, but the  
7 real key is a private investment legislation that will  
8 allow the international community to invest in Iraq  
9 with some guaranty that their investment won't be  
10 taken away from them by the government. That -- When  
11 that happens, (b)(3), (b)(6) there will be a flood of dough into  
12 Iraq.

13 On the electricity side, as you probably  
14 know, in September we reached the greatest amount of  
15 electricity that has been generated in a long, long  
16 time. It wasn't the 6,000 target that had been set,  
17 but it was pretty close to it, and with the movement  
18 of additional generators -- we just moved two  
19 (Inaudible) from Syria to (Inaudible), trying to get  
20 those (Inaudible) which have been on the Syrian border  
21 for years up to the Samarra plant, and these are 20  
22 generators, huge generators, HFO burning generators.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

I'm sorry. HFO, sir, is?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Heavy fuel oil.

So I just say that so that you see the connection with oil here. So that it is a by-product from the refineries that are needed to fuel these 20 generators.

So there has been some good things that have happened. But what Iraq needs and what we are working toward -- what MNFI, to be honest with you, is working toward is an energy strategy. There is a draft put together with the U.S. mission, Iraq, and just working to get Government of Iraq buy-in and understanding so that the future of Iraqi infrastructure, oil and electricity is managed in accordance with a plan that is more central and balances sometimes the competing needs of oil and electricity.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sir, probably not long

after we talked last, MNFI brought in and created a new position, brought in Brigadier Cripwell (Phonetic) to be the MNFI -- Right. Did that change anything about the way your interface with MNFI and --

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1 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Oh, that was  
2 awesome. That was a wonderful thing. So the energy  
3 fusion cell has done great things and has strengthened  
4 -- strengthened the relationship between the Coalition  
5 and the Government of Iraq, mainly our two ministries.  
6 But since then, we have branched out into the Ministry  
7 of Transportation and rail lines to be able to move  
8 product and crude. And of course, other things come  
9 from that.

10 The movement of Coalition goods north from  
11 the port of Um Qasr is a great example of that, but  
12 other -- I mean, it spurs economic growth to move  
13 other goods across Iraq.

14 So the energy fusion cell has been a good  
15 thing, a real good thing. Cripwell did great work.  
16 he has since left, and Brigadier Carou Wilks  
17 (Phonetic) has arrived and is just carrying doing the  
18 same thing.

19 His focus now, though, rightly so, has  
20 moved toward this strategic view of energy. So what  
21 the real benefit of the EFC has been, has been the  
22 relationship with the Ministries, a greater

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1 understanding. They have been able to work their  
2 priorities with the opportunities that we have  
3 highlighted, and to be able to realize more  
4 production, more export and more electricity. They  
5 have done it. We would like to think that we have  
6 assisted in that.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6)

8 Sir, one of the things  
9 that -- an initiative that has brought some results  
10 has been the Key Leader Engagement Initiative on the  
11 public affairs front, being able to put our senior  
12 officers out there and really make an effort to more  
13 directly get the word out on what we are doing,  
14 getting that message out.

15 Can you speak to me about what role you  
16 may have had in that, and realizing there may be some  
17 nuances to you being a Canadian General Officer  
18 relative to that, and I don't know what country  
19 restrictions you may have about speaking for the  
20 Coalition, have you seen effects from that? Have you  
21 been involved with that, and what are your thoughts on  
22 it?

MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Well, there are no

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1 limits put on me. I have not been asked to be overly  
2 involved in that other than from the Coalition's point  
3 of view. So not overly active in it, but have I seen  
4 results? I have seen huge results from the other key  
5 leaders that have spoken and continue to speak on a  
6 regular basis.

7 They speak with a very special level of  
8 understanding. They speak with facts, and that makes  
9 a great difference in all the countries that  
10 participate here and the whole international  
11 community.

12 So the regular engagements by the leaders,  
13 the fact that they are supported by hard facts and  
14 statistics, just gives greater credibility to their  
15 words. So I think it has been a very positive thing.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6)

17 Sir, we are coming to the  
18 end of the time I had on your schedule. If you have  
19 a few more minutes, I might ask you another question,  
20 but certainly, if you have to move in your schedule,  
21 I will wrap things up.

22 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: We can take a couple  
of minutes. I'm hoping that I can have you here one

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1 other time before I split.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) All right, sir.

3 I wanted to ask about MND-CS, because when  
4 we talked last, at that time during their eighth  
5 rotation, things were looking somewhat -- grim might  
6 be an overstatement, but they seemed to be pretty much  
7 pending at Forward Operating Base Echo. What has  
8 happened since then is the 9th rotation coming in and  
9 General Fouk (Phonetic).

10 It certainly seems as if it is a totally  
11 different picture down there now. Any thoughts on  
12 what was unique about the dynamic that they were able  
13 to change it so dramatically?

14 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: That's a great  
15 question, (b)(3), (b)(6) I would -- From where I sit at a  
16 distance from Camp Echo, but visiting and having  
17 visited there probably once a month at least over the  
18 past many months, 15 months actually -- So Fouk is my  
19 third Division Commander.

20 I think what has happened in MND-Center  
21 South is a very powerful example of the effect that  
22 leadership has in combat. General Fouk has taken a

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1 more aggressive, deliberate, realistic approach to the  
2 challenges of Diwaniyah and Katasiyah (Phonetic). He  
3 has employed the Special Forces much differently and  
4 way more aggressively.

5 He has a very strong relationship with the  
6 ODA that works and lives out at Camp Echo and have  
7 been involved in some great ops and some great  
8 targeting. So this is the ODA along with the --

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right. ODA is the  
10 Operations Detachment Alpha?

11 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. So U.S.  
12 Special Forces, together with ISOF.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) Iraqi Special Operations  
14 Forces?

15 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. Together

16 1.4b

17 operations, mainly in Diwaniyah but into the greater  
18 Diwaniyah area, that have targeted bad guys, and they  
19 have been extremely effective at that.

20 They have, I think, had a more deliberate  
21 engagement plan with the provincial leadership and the  
22 sheikhs and the ISF leadership. I think that General

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1 Fouk has -- and his staff have a good relationship  
2 with Commander at 8IA, General Uthman (Phonetic), and  
3 that has been beneficial.

4 I think the Corps has also done a  
5 reasonable job of supporting MND-Center South,  
6 supporting them with the resources they needed to be  
7 able to build two JSSs and some combat outposts,  
8 engineering assets, military police that have been  
9 involved in hiding and (Inaudible) the CLCs as well as  
10 the ISF. But above all, (b)(3), (b)(6) I would say it is a  
11 great example of the difference a leadership approach  
12 can make, and that is nothing against the other guys.

13 (b)(6) arrived at a time where the  
14 threat was peaking, and he dealt with it very  
15 appropriately and aggressively, given how many  
16 soldiers he had and the limits that he has on his  
17 soldiers. So while there's 1200 that are living  
18 there, very few actually are (Inaudible) forces.

19 Sorry, the other thing I should probably  
20 mention is he readjusted how many combat troops he  
21 had, which he was able to do, because -- and  
22 concentrated in Camp Echo, from Camp Delta as Camp

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1 Delta in Wasit Province went to MND-Center.

2 So having the infrastructure to run two  
3 camps, he was able to take the Camp Delta  
4 infrastructure and turn them into combat soldiers that  
5 could patrol and go outside the wire, and that was  
6 also an important element.

7 (b)(3), (b)(6): Sir, last question of  
8 this session: With the 18th Airborne Corps handover  
9 that will be coming up, is there are a counterpart  
10 18th Airborne Corps that you will be specifically be  
11 handing off your duties to?

12 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: Right. There will be  
13 another (Inaudible) who will come in behind me,  
14 Brigadier Nick Matern (Phonetic), awesome guy.  
15 Awesome guy, and he is one of two DCGs just like me.  
16 He is assigned to 18 Airborne Corps and lives in Fort  
17 Bragg. He arrived in Bragg this summer.

18 He has been over here on a PSS, and we  
19 probably talk every week or every other week, and all  
20 my meeting summaries, other reports that I get are all  
21 forwarded to him. So I am quite confident that he  
22 will come in here with a great level of understanding

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1 of what is happening in Iraq and with some great  
2 experience.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, anything I haven't  
4 asked you at this session that you wanted to comment  
5 on?

6 MAJ. GENERAL DEVLIN: No, I don't think  
7 so, (b)(3), (b)(6) I would like the opportunity to kind of  
8 close out with you in a few weeks here. That would be  
9 wonderful.

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) : I look forward to it,  
11 sir. Thanks.

12 That concludes this interview.

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